On the night of September 10, 2023, Yoan Heredia noticed the smell of Hexane was different. The flammable gas, usually a workplace hazard that refinery workers grow used to, hit him so hard that he felt “lightheaded and slightly confused.” An hour later, he heard a call on the radio: “Get out.” That’s all he remembers before an explosion tore through Archer Daniels Midland’s flagship soybean processing plant in Decatur, Illinois, leaving him with severe burns across his face and body.
Heredia was one of eight workers injured in the blast. The explosion knocked out a major processing facility, damaged nearby structures, and raised urgent questions: How did this happen? Why weren’t workers evacuated faster?
New OSHA records obtained by Investigate Midwest offer the clearest picture yet. The agency found that ADM’s safety failures were not accidental. They were systemic, documented, and decades old.
A Known Risk, Ignored
Fortune 500 companies know their risks. In 1997, ADM itself identified in internal safety documents that leaked Hexane posed a major threat to its operations. The company had access to industry-wide warnings, too: a 1994 explosion at an Indianapolis soybean plant injured 15 workers, and a 2003 blast at an Iowa facility killed two people. These weren’t freaks accidents. They were preventable failures.
Yet when OSHA investigators examined ADM’s Decatur facility after the 2023 explosion, they found evidence that the company had not adequately prepared for the risk it knew existed.
The Training Deficit
OSHA’s investigation revealed troubling gaps in worker preparation. The agency found that ADM provided incorrect guidance about critical safety equipment. A longtime supervisor completed a complicated procedure related to the Hexane system by “memory” rather than proper protocol. A newly hired supervisor was unaware of important safety tools.
This is not incompetence; it is cost-cutting. Comprehensive safety training takes time and resources. Cut training budgets, and a procedure that should be learned from documentation and certification instead becomes something a supervisor improvises from habit. The risk compounds with each untrained worker.
The Alarm That Didn’t Save Anyone
Workers and automated systems detected the leaked Hexane roughly an hour before the explosion. An alarm sounded. Someone noted the Hexane’s presence. But no evacuation order appears to have been issued in time, according to OSHA records. In the crucial window between detection and disaster, the facility’s safety culture and leadership failed to act with urgency. By the time Heredia felt the overwhelming smell and heard the radio call, it was too late.
What Comes Next
After the explosion, ADM posted regular updates about its injured employees on its website. It did not offer any explanation of the cause, despite pleas from U.S. Representative Nikki Budzinski (D-Illinois) for answers. “We need answers,” she said publicly. The company hired outside experts to investigate but blocked OSHA from interviewing them, according to federal records. A former Department of Labor attorney told Investigate Midwest that OSHA “could have fought harder” for transparency.
The tragedy is that this outcome was preventable. The risk was documented. The history was clear. What was missing was the will to prioritize worker safety over operational cost-cutting.
For Heredia and seven other workers, that failure resulted in severe burns, trauma, and an upended life. For farmworkers across the supply chain who depend on processors like ADM, it’s a reminder: consolidation concentrates not just power but also risk. When one company controls critical infrastructure, its failures affect everyone downstream.
Read more: Investigate Midwest’s full investigation
Cross-read: Court: Wage cuts for seasonal farmworkers illegal, ICE Enforcement Surge Hits Food System Workers Hard, USDA’s New REAP Rule Locks Out Small Farmers
